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Contractual rights, money and banking, and labor are surely central to the myriad of
ways in which law can intersect with political development. The three books here each
take up one of these elements in very different ways. 1 Each covers different ranges of
history: Eric Lomazoff looks primarily at the early national era up through Andrew
-DFNVRQ¶VYHWRRIWKH UHFKDUWHULQJELOORIWKH%DQNRIWKH United States in 1832; James
(O\¶V QDUUDWLYH RQ WKH &RQWract Clause spans the entire history of the Constitution; and
-RKQ)OLWHU¶VIRFXVRQFKLOGODERUSULPDULO\WDNHVSODFHGXULQJWKH3URJUHVVLYH(UDDQGWKH
New Deal. The resolution of these issues at given moments in time sets the stage for
conflict at a later time. The resulting conflict sometimes is over the same issue and
sometimes sets the stage for conflict in a tangential issue area. Though the issues are
fundamentally economic, eventually, social issues are implicated²and in case of child
labor, indicated directly. The sum allows us to triangulate the complexity of elements in
law and political economy that can drive policy change. There is no grand unified theory
here: these books are very different, and that variety provides its own richness.
The place of McCulloch v. Maryland2 is well entrenched in American political
historiography and doctrinal development, and one might expect there would be little new
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3. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 25, 27.
4. Id. at 20.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 25.
7. Id. at 30; see also WOLFGANG STREECK & KATHLEEN THELEN, Introduction: Institutional Change in
Advanced Political Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL
ECONOMIES 1, 26 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005).
8. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 60.
9. Id. at 64. This was also an age of insider lending, done in part as a means of credit monitoring. See NAOMI
R. LAMOREAUX, INSIDER LENDING: BANKS, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1983).
It is also in an age where the person and the office were not necessarily separated. See, e.g., BRIAN PHILLIPS
MURPHY, BUILDING THE EMPIRE STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2015).
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to learn. But Eric Lomazoff does just that by identifying the dog that did not bark: the
Coinage Clause. When teaching McCulloch, some of my students have suggested this
clause could justify the requisite Congressional power; I have typically responded by
observing that no key actor used it in 1791, the year the First Bank was established, nor in
1819, when McCulloch was decided. After all, at the time, the concept of a central bank
as a regulator of the money supply was poorly understood. Reconstructing the National
Bank Controversy explodes this notion.
Lomazoff presents a series of stylized vignettes to several chapters that capture the
central elements of conventional understandings. Though this might turn off some readers,
I find it effective. He has a good mind for disaggregating conceptual distinctions. For
example, he distinguishes three distinct standards of necessity used in the debates on the
First Bank. The first is functional necessity, which is the classic debate over whether
³QHFHVVDU\´PHDQV³DEVROXWHO\QHFHVVDU\´RUPHUHO\³XVHIXO´ 3 The second is a federal
understanding: was a state-based alternative available?4 The third standard concerns
whether this is a power typically exercised by other sovereign governments. 5 Even if the
Bank survived the first standard, it could fail on the second, should other banks exist.
Notably, Lomazoff claims that opponents did not coalesce around one single objection;
Representative Michael Jenifer Stone of Maryland, for one, argued the bank must satisfy
all three standards.6 In 1791, no arguments addressed the Coinage Clause nor a monetary
function.
In the succeeding years, multiple branches of the National Bank were created, as
were many state-chartered banks. An open question in 1791 was whether two note-creating
banks could coexist in the same city. By the end of the decade, it was clear they could;
each accepted the others notes and settled accounts regularly. The Federal Bank, being
larger, usually held credit for state bank notes after settlement. It used this leverage to
regulate credit creation: if a state bank exceeded a reasonable multiple, the Federal Bank
could present its notes for redemption. This tended to constrict excessive state bank
lending. Lomazoff draws on Streeck and Thelen to characterize this as institutional drift²
an institution taking on a crucial function distinct from the original purpose. 7 Circumstance
DQGOXFNDSSHDUWRKDYHSOD\HGDUROHLQWKH%DQN¶VEHKDYLRULWGLGQRWDFWDVDSUHGDWRU
Lomazoff credits its twenty-year, time-limited charter combined with two related factors.
First, H[FHVVLYHO\OLPLWLQJORFDOEDQNVZRXOGEH³SROLWLFDOVXLFLGH,´LQWKDWLWZRXOGKDYH
engendered political opposition to a recharter.8 6HFRQGWKH%DQN¶VPRQHWDU\IXQFWLRQZDV
made apparent from economic events.9
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10. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 78±79.
11. Id. at 89.
12. Id. at 94.
13. Id. at 100.
14. Id. at 112±13; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
15. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 112. He leaves open the question of Madison¶s view of the Coinage Clause
argument.
16. Id. at 126.
17. Id. at 130.
18. Id. at 124±25, 128, 133. This is a good example of where Lomazoff follows his evidence as far as it goes,
but no further.
19. 5 U.S. 137 (1803); see Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans),
and Why You Shouldn’t Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 (2003).
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Lomazoff productively directs substantial attention to the recharter battles of 1811,
1815, and 1816. By 1811, Jeffersonians were divided: some adopted the functionalist
argument that there was no enumerated power that justified a bank, and others articulated
the federal argument, pointing to existing state banks. 10 Recharter supporters noted the
bank had gained legitimacy by its existence over twenty years; new branches added during
-HIIHUVRQ¶VSUHVLGHQF\ IXUWKHUVXSSRUWHGLWVFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\2WKHUVXSSRUWHUVQRWHGLWV
monetary regulatory function. Interestingly, Henry Clay claimed this regulatory power
was itself not enumerated and was therefore unconstitutional.11 With a split JeffersonianRepublican coalition, the recharter failed.12
The War of 1812 placed immense stress on Government finances.13 State banks
suspended specie payments during wartime and delayed resumption. This resulted in
excessive note circulation, overextended lending, and inflation. To reenact a bank,
members of Congress needed to either revise their views or find a new justification for
one. Following a rejection of a new charter in 1815, Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
J. Dallas in 1816 predicated the bank not on the power to borrow, but on the Coinage
Clause.14 The constitutional question concerned whether this referred only to physical
coins, or to a broader definition of money. Lomazoff argues the 1816 legislation was a
compromise that allowed a Republican coalition to finesse its divide on the Sweeping
Clause.15
When this charter was challenged in McCulloch v. Maryland,16 there was no
discussion of the Coinage Clause nor an account of the bank as a monetary actor. 17 Yet,
LQ  WKH  GHEDWHV ZHUH UHFHQW KLVWRU\ /RPD]RII QRWHV DOVR WKDW 0DU\ODQG¶V
purpose in enacting a tax was to raise revenue, and wonders why Maryland did not simply
concede the constitutionality of the bank²WKXVUHQGHULQJWKHILUVWSDUWRI-RKQ0DUVKDOO¶V
opinion unnecessary. Lomazoff suggests that perhaps it was Marshall himself who raised
this question, but he does not have direct evidence, and does not pursue it further.18 But,
arguably, the misdirection by Marshall in McCulloch approaches that in Marbury v.
Madison.19
Members of Congress did refer to the coinage argument in the late 1820s. Albert
Gallatin was recruited to write an article justifying the bank based on the power to regulate
the currency in the recharter episode of 1832. And, President Andrew Jackson addressed
the Coinage Clause argument in his veto message, claiming the regulatory power could
not be delegated to a corporation²identifying the problem as delegation, not existence of
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20. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 142, 151, 153.
21. 79 U.S. 457 (1871).
22. 75 U.S. 603 (1869).
23. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 161±64. Given that elsewhere Lomazoff is careful not to exceed his evidence,
the speculation here is striking.
24. For example, Lomazoff speculates that Jerry Mashaw, in not mentioning Jackson¶s delegation argument
must likely have read an edited version of Jackson¶s veto message; perhaps, or perhaps not. See id. at 154
(referring to JERRY MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 100 YEARS OF
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012)).
25. On Benton, see BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE
CIVIL WAR 341 (1957); Daniel Indiviglio, Bernanke to Ron Paul: Gold Isn’t Money, ATLANTIC (July 13, 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/07/bernanke-to-ron-paul-gold-isnt-money/241903/.
26. HAMMOND, surpa note 25, at 275.
27. See Richard Sylla, Robert E. Wright & David J. Cowen, Alexander Hamilton, Central Banker: Crisis
Management During the U.S. Financial Panic of 1792, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 61 (2009).
28. LOMAZOFF, supra note 1, at 130±31.
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Congressional authority.20 Jackson, thus, did accept the monetary power in principle.
Lomazoff concludes by trying to connect the 1816 justification for the Bank to the
logic used for the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, as well as more recent
justifications. He notes that Justice Strong, in Knox v. Lee,21 declined to specifically
RYHUUXOH-XVWLFH&KDVH¶VGHFLVLRQLQHepburn v. Griswald22 that the Coinage Clause only
referred to actual metal coins. He suggests that Strong could have done so, and speculates
that Strong could have had Clay and Calhoun in mind²but this is only thinly supported
by evidence offered.23
Reconstructing the National Bank Controversy is thought provoking (though at
times a bit more contentious than seems necessary).24 The constitutional question of
whether to read the Coinage Clause narrowly, as physical coins only, or broadly to include
all forms of money implies economic learning. How should advances in economic theory
impact the interpretation of the Coinage Clause? Should it change when political actors
implement theoretical developments? After all, for decades after, many prominent
$PHULFDQVWKRXJKWRIVSHFLHDVEHLQJ³UHDO´UDQJLQJDWOHDVWIURP7KRPDV+DUW%HQWRQ
during antebellum years, to Ron Paul in a colloquy with Ben Bernanke in 2011. 25
Bray Hammond, commenting on the development of a fractional reserve ratio of
five-to-RQH ILYHGROODUVOHQWRXWIRUHDFKGROODULQVSHFLH VWDWHG³,GRXEWLIRQHEDQNHU
in four clearly understood what he was doLQJ DQG ZKDW PDGH LW VRXQG DQG SURSHU´26
According to Hammond, when the continued existence of the bank was debated, neither
John Adams nor Thomas Jefferson thought it was legitimate. Hammond suggests that even
Hamilton did not think it was legitimate in 1791, when the Bank was debated. But
Lomazoff shows that fractional reserve banking flourished in the 1790s²even if people
did not understand the what level of reserve ratio was required to establish a stable
monetary system. Richard Sylla et al. demonstrate Hamilton directed monetary actions in
the panic of 1792.27 In the financial wake of the War of 1812, and in debates in 1816, it is
clear that many legislators recognized the monetary regulatory function.
Lomazoff characterizes McCulloch as an example of departmentalism.28 But this
VHHPV WR LJQRUH WKH ODVW WZR VHQWHQFHV RI WKDW GHFLVLRQ¶V ILUVW SDUDJUDSK ZKHUH -XVWLFH
0DUVKDOOGHFODUHV³>$@QGLILWLVWREHVRGHFLGHGE\WKLVWULEXQDODORQHFDQWKHGHFLVLRQ
be made. On the Supreme Court of the United States has the constitution of our country
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29. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819).
30. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY xi (2007).
31. See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (1938).
32. ELY, supra note 1, at 18±22.
33. 10 U.S. 87, 137 (1810).
34. ELY, supra note 1, at 32±35.
35. Id. at 36±39; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
36. ELY, supra note 1, at 43±44.
37. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). This decision ruled that the state could build
a competing bridge irrespective of an existing state grant for a bridge over the same river.
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GHYROYHGWKLVLPSRUWDQWGXW\´ 29 It is ambiguous as to whether this statement exemplifies
mere judicial review, where the judiciary has authority when a dispute comes before it, or
whether it exemplifies what Keith Whittington terms judicial supremacy²that not only
must the Supreme Court decide on constitutionality, but the other governmental branches
DUH WKHQ ERXQG WR IROORZ LW¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ30 Mere judicial review is consistent with
departmentalism, judicial supremacy certainly is not. To me, McCulloch seems ambiguous
RQ WKLV SRLQW WKRXJK WHQGLQJ WRZDUGV WKH ODWWHU  5HJDUGOHVV -XVWLFH 0DUVKDOO¶V
(purposeful?) omission of the Coinage Clause is significant.
-DPHV (O\ -U¶V The Contract Clause spans the entire history of the Constitution
with a singular doctrinal focus. A similar effort has apparently not been taken up since
%HQMDPLQ ) :ULJKW¶V  DQDO\VLV31 The legal history provided is both detailed and
extensive, exploring the vast permutatioQVRIWKHFODXVH¶VDSSOLFDWLRQV7KHFKDSWHUVDUH
organized by chronological time period, and sections within each chapter concern areas of
dispute that often recur in multiple chapters. Examples include Public Contracts,
Bankruptcy Laws, and Judicial Impairments. Ely argues, contra to Wright, that the
founding generation intended the Contract Clause to apply to contracts where the state is
a party, as well as those between private parties. 32 While evidence from the Philadelphia
Convention as to the purposes of the clause is thin, he provides some evidence that state
contracts were meant to be included.
The Marshall Era evidences strengthened use of the clause. The analysis of Fletcher
v. Peck,33 for example, centers not on judicial review of state legislation, but whether
contracts where the state is a party are covered by the clause. 34 The Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward case, striking down a state law altering the college charter, is
characterized as upholding contemporary perspectives, although treating charitable
corporate charters as contracts.35 More interesting is action in the states. A debt relief law
in North Carolina asserted the importance of enforcing contractual obligations, while at
the same time distinguishing the right from the remedy. Yet, the delays inherent in the
judicial process served to provide temporary relief for debtors to reorganize their affairs. 36
This would recur, in other times and circumstances.
The Taney period is portrayed as substantially continuing the Marshall Court
doctrine. The Charles River Bridge decision,37 that state-granted contracts did not extend
to implicit features, modified Dartmouth College and sought to minimize monopoly rights,
but it maintained the preferred position of contracts. Yet the Contract Clause did not take
precedence over the power of eminent domain; a state could, with just compensation,
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ELY, supra note 1, at 76±77.
Id. at 77±78.
Id. at 82±85.
Id. at 88.
42 U.S. 311 (1843).
ELY, supra note 1, at 89±93.
Id. at 113±14.
See MORTON J. HORWITZ. THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 35±38 (1992); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
167, 181 (Harcourt, Brace & Howe Inc. 1920).
46. ELY, supra note 1, at 149.
47. Id. at 151±52.
48. Id. at 152±55.
49. Id. at 155±57.
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38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
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abrogate a contractual grant. 38 So too for police powers.39 But a state could issue tax
exemptions that would bind future legislatures²with three Southern Justices objecting
strenuously, fearing apparently for states rights. 40 So there were serious conceptual
tensions in which state sovereign powers could not be bargained away via contracts made
by the state and state sovereign power which could. One significant difference between
Marshall and Taney concerned the relation of a contractual right and its remedy: Marshall
conceived of them as distinct, while Taney conceived of right and remedy as intrinsically
connected.41 But the question is whether parties in advance might reasonably anticipate
whether remedy might be altered later. In Bronson v. Kinzie,42 the Taney Court ruled that
a legislature could bind its successors in some areas; this strengthened the rights of those
with state contracts. But during financial panics, some state-level courts granted the
validity of debt relief laws, contra to Supreme Court rulings. 43
Civil War and Reconstruction inevitably raised questions related to times of war.
Were wartime debts contracted with Confederate currency satisfied if paid with notes that
had since become severely devalued? Could equity as a principle prevail over the strict
terms of the contracts? Were debts that were contracted for slaves but not paid valid in the
wake of the Thirteenth Amendment? 44 Does the immorality of slavery, now abolished,
impact prior slave purchase contracts, where a creditor makes a claim for the sale? These
TXHVWLRQVYH[HGWKHFRXUWV7KHDQVZHUVSURYLGHDQLQWHUHVWLQJJORVVRQWKH³PHHWLQJRI
WKHPLQGV´WKHRU\RIFRQWUDFW²here the meeting of the minds did not control the outcome,
yet this was well before Holmes made his contribution to contract theory where he
FULWLFL]HG WKH ³PHHWLQJ RI WKH PLQGV´ FRQFHSWLRQ +ROPHV LQVWHDG DGYRFDWHG REMHFWLYH
standards.45
A gradual decline and then precipitous fall followed. During the Gilded Age, the
artificiality of the distinction between right and remedy was increasingly recognized.
(OLPLQDWLQJGHEWRU¶VMDLOPLJKWKDYHZHDNHQHGWKHFKDQFHVRIDFUHGLWRUUHFRXSLQJWKHLU
loss, but society and the courts considered the practice archaic. 46 Debt relief measures
were enacted during economic downturns, designed particularly to alleviate those in
distressed rural communities.47 Whether corporate charters should be characterized as
contracts was disputed, 48 and railroad rates, even if publicly contracted, were subject to
succeeding regulations.49 Justice Shiraz wrote for a unanimous Court that contracts made
for public purposes, pursuant to a legislative act, were subject to revision. A subsequent
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50. Id. at 164.
51. ELY, supra note 1, at 162.
52. Id. at 198.
53. 209 U.S. 398 (1934).
54. ELY, supra note 1, at 232±33. The relevant opinion was E. N.Y. Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230
(1945).
55. ELY, supra note 1, at 43.
56. HORWITZ, supra note 45, at 131; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV.
1, 5 (1894).
57. On marginalism, see R.D. COLLISON BLACK, A.W. COATS & CRAWFORD D.W. BLACK, THE MARGINAL
REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS: INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION (1973); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1964); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1996); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm. 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
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legislature could change the terms of the law without violating the Contract Clause.50
Elements of public policy exposed stresses on distinctions between policies that could
infringe on the Contract Clause right, and those that could not. Thus debts could be
discharged under bankruptcy law, and police powers could be upheld against claims that
the exertion of the power reduced contracted property values. 51 By the end of the Gilded
Age, the Due Process Clause was increasingly supplanting the Contract Clause as
protection for economic rights.
Even prior to the New Deal, new economic developments led to increasing stress on
a strict construction of the Clause. For example, rent controls in Washington, D.C. and
New York City during World War I led to questions of what constitutes an emergency,
and whether courts could review legislative decisions to declare an emergency. 52 But
Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell was the watershed moment, with Chief Justice
Hughes providing rationales for allowing legislative moratoriums on mortgage
contracts.53 Certainly the New Deal financial crisis was an emergency, and that declaration
by Hughes might have indicated some limitations. But by the early 1940s, Justice
Frankfurter declared that the exertion of state police power could be implied for all
contracts, thus permitting legislatures to do what they wanted, as opposed to emphasizing
the sanctity of contracts as the basis of a free society. 54
Ely provides an extensive history of private Contract Clause disputes over debt relief
laws, dating to at least the 1807 economic stress, with more following the War of 1812.55
When analyzing BlaisdellKHFULWLTXHVWKH1HZ'HDO&RXUW¶VXVHRIEDODQFLQJWHVWVUDWKHU
than absolute prohibition of contracts. However, he does not place the use of balancing
tests in context; Morton Horwitz identifies Holmes as providing the first theoretical
MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUXVHRIDEDODQFLQJWHVWLQKLVHVVD\³3ULYLOHJH0DOLFHDQG,QWHQW´56
Ely does not wrestle with this legacy. Further, by the Great Depression, the economy was
vastly more interconnected than before, and economic theory had advanced substantially.
While the Marginal Revolution of the 1870s could support a strict interpretation of the
Contract CODXVH .H\QHV¶ General Theory DQG 6FKXPSHWHU¶V History of Economic
Analysis suggest substantially more room for governmental intervention, particularly in a
FULVLV$QGDVWULFW&RDVHDQYLHZPHUHO\QHHGDGRSW)UDQNIXUWHU¶VYLHZWKDWWKHSRVVLELOLW\
of government intervention can be implied for all contracts. The lack of perfectly clear and
stable property rights may reduce overall social output, but it is the world of politics that
impinges on it.57 2UWRSXWLWDQRWKHUZD\WKH³QHHGIRUVSHHG´WKDW+RZDUG6FKZHEHU
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58. HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE CREATION OF AMERICAN COMMON LAW, 1850±1880: TECHNOLOGY,
POLITICS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF CITIZENSHIP (2004).
59. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
60. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
61. FLITER, supra note 1, at 35±36.
62. Id. at 58±65; Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).

42010-tul_55-2 Sheet No. 22 Side B

identifies during the period of railroad expansion provided the sort of economic impetus
for legal alteration of property rights, Contract Clause or not. 58 And Coase did not care
what the law was, only that it was clear and stable. Given the Schumpeterian creative
destruction process of new industries supplanting existing businesses, a regulatory role for
WKH VWDWH FRXOG KHOS VPRRWK WKH WUDQVLWLRQ ,I VR WKHQ )UDQNXUWHU¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW
government action can be implied for all contracts provides a solution: the role of
government is expected, and the resulting property rights regime sufficiently clear and
stable enough to satisfy that Coasean imperative.
While Ely laments the demise of the Contract Clause during the New Deal, John
Fliter celebrates the demise of the worst forms of child labor in that same time period. The
landmark cases of Hammer v. Dagenhart59 and United States v. Darby60 bracket one of
the seminal conflicts in American constitutional development concerning the powers of
the Federal Government: Hammer struck down a child labor law, and was expressly
overturned in Darby. An effort seeking to glean the essence of the political disputes over
the labor issues from within the four corners of the United States Reports leads to a
WUXQFDWHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJ)OLWHU¶V&hild Labor in America provides a corrective.
He begins depicting the child labor problem as it developed in the first industrial
revolution, starting with the decline of the guild system. Child labor for some families was
an economic good. Children worked in jobs requiring manual dexterity, such as textiles,
and in dangerous conditions, such as coal mines. Many became poisoned from arsenic,
nicotine, or coal dust and worked extremely long hours. In the late 1800s, piecework
performed in tenements of urban areas by parents and children added a new dimension to
the child labor problem.
Few states enacted child labor laws. The patchwork of state labor bureaus produced
uneven record gathering, inspection, and enforcement. In many Southern states laws were
nonexistent. The federal government haltingly began to investigate conditions, including
an 1892 investigation of the sweating system. The 1898 Industrial Commission report
identified evidence of widespread child labor and found little justification for it. A review
of state laws found state labor laws did work in the states that enacted them and also
connected child education needs to the child labor problem. 61
The National Child Labor Committee (NCLC) was formed in 1904. It initially
focused on information gathering, public education, and state-level action, including
mandatory education. Indiana Senator Albert Beverage was the principle legislative
sponsor for a federal child labor law. His first bill proposed a ban on interstate shipment
of goods made with child labor; this ostensibly would fall under the Interstate Commerce
Clause and was consistent with Champion v. Ames.62 It would be a model for the bill that
was enacted a decade later. President Roosevelt committed only to an investigative bureau,
while opponents feared loss of state autonomy.
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The Keating-2ZHQ$FWRIDGRSWHGPXFKRI%HYHULGJH¶VSURSRVHGFRQWHQW63
This led to the Hammer v. Dagenhart drama, where the Supreme Court ruled the Act
exceeded congressional power. Fliter effectively narrates the legal arguments surrounding
the apparent inconsistencies in Due Process and Commerce Clause jurisprudence at the
time. Activists were confident that the moral and health concerns of children could justify
the exemption of child labor from the Due Process doctrine that privileged contractual
liberty. But of course Hammer ruled that since the articles made by children were harmless,
the morality-based exceptions did not apply. This is well known. But Fliter provides
evidence that the Keating-Owen Act actually did reduce incidences of child labor, only to
increase again following Hammer.64 State laws continued to vary, and states with lax laws
did attract employers seeking low-wage labor.
After this defeat, advocates shifted their tactics to the Taxation Clause, by taxing the
profits of firms using children fourteen years or younger. This seemed more likely to
survive judicial review in light of McCray v. United States,65 which upheld a tax on
oleomargarine. Opponents in the Senate filled the Congressional Record in anticipation of
a legal challenge; they asserted that tax revenue was pretextual and that the act would
regulate areas properly left to states. Nonetheless, it was enacted and also was effective in
reducing employment of children.66 Opponents brought test cases before sympathetic
Federal Judge James Boyd in North Carolina²the same judge who struck down the
Keating-Owen Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court struck it down, with Chief Justice Taft
distinguishing this issue from other permitted federal taxes (such as on phosphorous
matches and narcotics).67
Stymied again, child advocates sought to amend the Constitution to allow Congress
to regulate child labor. One constitutional issue concerned language. An early version used
³HPSOR\PHQW´EXWEHFDXVHVRPHFKLOGUHQZRUNZLWKSDUHQWVRIIWKHSD\UROODGYRFDWHV
IDYRUHGWKHZRUG³ODERU´68 But this caused concern because it seemed to include work
done on a farm. A second issue concerned whether concurrent state power should be
included in the text. A proposal for ratification by state conventions failed. 69 The Child
Labor Amendment then passed both Houses overwhelmingly; it did not include an
expiration date.
Interest groups mobilized on both sides for state ratification debates. Opponents
claimed that these were socialist ideas that would lead to federal encroachment and the
destruction of parental authority. The Catholic Church came out against it, seeing it as a
vehicle that, combined with education laws, would weaken Catholic schools and parental
authority. It received nearly unanimous defeat in Southern states. But it also failed
spectacularly in an advisory referendum in Massachusetts, and then in the New York State
Legislature.70 A renewed effort to ratify the Amendment came during the Great
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Depression. Fourteen states ratified the Amendment in 1933, and several states passed
more restrictive child labor laws. 71
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) included codes for labor that
restricted child labor. Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued a blanket code effective to end of
1933, limiting work to those at least sixteen years old, with some minor exceptions. The
HIIHFWZDVVLJQLILFDQWRYHUFKLOGUHQ³ORVW´ZRUNDVDUHVXOW 72 Success of the codes
slowed momentum for Child Labor Amendment.
After A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States73 invalidated NIRA, the
incidence of child labor again increased. This in turn led to renewed efforts to ratify the
Child Labor Amendment. By late 1930s, twenty-eight states had ratified the Child Labor
Amendment, still short of the thirty-six needed.74 It is one of six constitutional
DPHQGPHQWV DSSURYHG E\ &RQJUHVV WKDW UHPDLQV ³RXW WKHUH´ XQUDWLILHG 7KHUH ZHUH
FRQFHUQV³WKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWPLJKWKROd that the Amendment was not ratified in a
UHDVRQDEOH DPRXQW RI WLPH´75²an interesting episode in light of the Twenty-Seventh
$PHQGPHQW¶VXQXVXDO-year path to ratification. Kentucky and Kansas each ratified it
in the 1930s, reversing earlier rejections. This led to litigation and a ruling that the earlier
rejections had no legal significance.
7KH³6ZLWFK LQ7LPH´ FOHDUO\SURvided the federal government authority to
regulate. Despite this, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that would implement some
regulations was hotly contested and revised multiple times. The FLSA moved out of the
House Rules Committee only with a discharge petition. It was initially defeated on the
floor of the House (a first for FDR), before being resurrected in shorter form. It was
enacted, but only after another discharge petition got it to the floor of the House. 76 This
was the law upheld in United States. v. Darby and which explicitly overruled Hammer v.
Dagenhart.
Each of these monographs depicts economic learning and the impact on law. Early
Americans learned about the monetary function, mid-century Americans discovered the
challenge of displacement by more advanced technological developments, and child labor
advocates learned that state-based regulations did not work in an increasingly
interconnected world. The triangulation of these narratives can serve as a sort of substitute
for overarching theories of political economic development. The turn of the century
economist Edwin R.A. Seligman noted that, for all its flaws, Marx presented the first
theory of historical development.77 In that approach, the economic base determines much
of the societal superstructure. While over-determined, there is something in the core of
economic changes that impact other changes. Other attempts to provide a comprehensive
developmental logic, such as critical realignment theory, have unsurprisingly fallen
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short.78 Whether intending to do so or not, each of these works sheds light on ways in
which the thickening of the political and economic universe was filtered through legal
structures. And a fair reading allows us to recognize the inevitable tension in the change.
The intersection in some instances is direct. The Legal Tender Cases, for example,
are significant for Ely because they explore how stresses on complications with contracts,
and political-economic predilections of the Justices, most notably Justice Chase, impact
contract doctrine. For Lomazoff, the significance is the extent to which the Coinage Clause
debates from 1816 and 1832 managed to find their way into the consciousness of the
Justices. The episodes serve different purposes, and the divergent purposes have distinct
implications for economic policy in each work. Some caution and humility seems
warranted as a result. Different authors identify different stress points, even within the
same legal opinion. Each follows the logic to its logical conclusion. But the different foci
RI WKH DXWKRUV VXJJHVW PXOWLIDFHWHG VHWV RI LPSOLFDWLRQV ZKHUHE\ WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V
perspective drives the conclusion.
Emergencies, unsurprisingly, impact each narrative, whether financial stress of the
War of 1812, of contracts made in confederate dollars during the Civil War, or child labor
in the Great Depression. The latter provides both a death knell for the Contract Clause,
while simultaneously providing opportunity for progress on child labor legislation. The
same New Deal that eviscerated the Contract Clause empowered government to implement
the culmination of a decades-long movement to eradicate child labor. Each work identifies
the many veto points, complicated processes, and obstacles to enacting significant social
legislation in the United States. One author gnashes his teeth, while the others celebrate,
but for very different reasons. Would it have been possible to have federal authority of
child labor without limiting the reach of the Contract Clause?
Reading these books in tandem suggests a vibrancy for exploring the intersection of
economic developments and law, and they suggest a myriad on multidirectional
interactions and effects. The scholarly triangulation process, of course, requires a
multitude of such monographs read by a single observer. The hope is that eventually the
sum is even greater than the parts.

